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JAN-WILLEM VAN DER RIJT
An ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF THE FORMATION
OF POLITICAL COALITIONS
ABSTRACT. Most models of the formation of political coalitions use
either Euclidean spaces or rely purely on game theory. This limits their
applicability. In this article, a single model is presented which is more
broadly applicable. In principle any kind of set can be used as a policy
space. The model is also able to incorporate different kinds of party
motivations: both rent-seeking and idealism. The model uses party pre-
ferences and power to identify stable coalitions and predict government
policy as well as to indicate which member of the opposition will be able
to break up the governing coalition if no stable coalition exists. In the
latter case it will also indicate on which issue the government is likely to
split. Parties may have preferences over issues such as the composition
of cabinet and/or the governing coalition as well as the more traditional
issues of government formation. The model also provides a rationale for
log-rolling.
KEY WORDS: political coalitions, government formation, coalition for-
mation, log-rolling, government policy.
1. INTRODUCTION
Most of the literature on the formation of political coalitions
focuses either on Euclidian-spatial analysis (for an overview,
see Ordeshook (1997)) or solely on matters of distribution
(e.g. Riker (1962)). In models based on Euclidean spaces, the
primary motivation for party behaviour in forming coaliti-
ons is often idealistic (the goal for parties is to get policy as
close to their own preferences as possible). The most famous
result of this kind of analysis is Black’s median voter theo-
rem (Black (1958)). Many models which focus on positioning
of parties prior to elections which use Euclidean spaces are
based on purely rent seeking party behaviour (such as the
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classic models of Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957)). The
behaviour of these parties during the formation of govern-
ment after the election can still be seen as idealistic as the
positions of the parties are fully determined at that time (this
argument is also used by Laver and Shepsle (1996)). Other
articles using spacial analysis include Baron (1991), McKelvey
(1976) and Plott (1967).
Models focusing on distribution place emphasis on rent-
seeking (also known as ofﬁce seeking) as the primary moti-
vation in party behaviour (being in government is equated to
power or to the right to distribute a (sizeable) amount of
money, and each party intends to get as large a piece of the
action as possible for itself and/or its followers). These models
tend to rely heavily on game theoretic concepts. A well-
known result from this kind of analysis is Riker’s theory of
minimal-winning coalitions (Riker (1962)). Other works pla-
cing emphasis on game-theoretic aspects of government for-
mation are for example Peleg (1981) and Van Deemen (1989).
Most authors acknowledge that both motivations proba-
bly occur in real life but argue that either one or the other
motivation is of far greater importance and build their model
around the motivation of their choosing. Some, however, try
to use both motivations, for example Kirchsteiger and Puppe
(1997).
Kirchsteiger and Puppe start their analysis with a model
based on ofﬁce seeking behaviour where each party seeks
to maximise its relative weight within the governing coali-
tion and propose two different ways of adjusting the model
to accommodate policy seeking considerations. In the ﬁrst
approach they assume the largest party in the coalition gets
to determine the policy, whereas in the second they base their
analysis on a distance measure on the policy space. The ﬁrst
approach is only applicable in situations where the largest
party indeed wields excessive inﬂuence over policy, which need
not always be the case; see for instance the example below.
The second approach is problematic in cases where the policy
space consists of issues of a different nature, i.e. where some
issues can be adequately represented by a Euclidean space, but
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others require a different kind of set – as this will give rise
to difﬁculties when deﬁning an adequate and realistic distance
measure for such policy spaces. Furthermore, they deﬁne their
distance measure in such a way that parties who are not a
member of a winning coalition are indifferent with respect to
the policy outcomes, which is not a very realistic assumption.
In this article a model is presented, that is also designed
to incorporate both kinds of party motivation and to be as
broadly applicable as possible. The main focus of this article
is conceptual: next to the presentation of the model, the main
emphasis is on the underlying reasons for this adopting this
approach. For more technical results the reader is referred
to Rusinowska et al. (2005) where such results are deduced
for a generalisation of the model presented here. The model
also serves as the basis for a number of other papers (see
Section 6). In order to illustrate the advantages of applying
both rent seeking and policy seeking motivations in a single
model, an example will be presented that will show the possi-
bility of the formation of a non-minimum winning coalition 1
(often a problem for models focusing on distribution). Fur-
thermore, the model will be shown to be able to account for
the occurrence of log-rolling2 (the occurrence of which is hard
to explain by means of Euclidean-spatial models). It will also
be shown that some of the drawbacks of the models proposed
by Kirchsteiger and Puppe can be avoided using this model.
2. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL
In this section, an alternative model is constructed that can
accommodate a number of the aforementioned objections.
Subsequently, the model will be evaluated paying special
attention to the capacity of this model to handle issues pro-
blematic for standard theory and to objections which may be
raised against this new model.
The model will, given the outcome of the election and
preferences of all parties, be able to answer the following
questions:
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1. Can a government be formed?
2. If so, can the coalition which will form this government be
determined?
3. Is this coalition stable?
The model to be presented here shows strong resemblance
to standard non-transferable utility games. It cannot be fully
described by such standard games, though, as coalitions may
generate pay-offs to parties which are not part of the coali-
tion. For more on games with this spillover property (see
Thijssen et al. (2002)).
An M-dimensionial policy space B is assumed, consisting
of M < ∞ mutually independent sub-spaces: B = B1 × B2 ×
· · ·×BM . Each of these sub-spaces can be regarded as a sepa-
rate issue on which government must make a decision. Many
such issues can be represented using (a sub-set of) R, many
others cannot. In the latter case one could think of issues
where the number of alternatives is limited, such as implemen-
ting (or abolishing) universal conscription. One either does or
does not implement such a policy, no in between alternative is
available. Bj can be either a Euclidean space, or (in principle)
any other type of set (including multi-dimensional ones).
In addition to the policy space B, a set of parties P , con-
sisting of N <∞ parties, is assumed. All parties are supposed
to have preferences on all issues. For the time being all parties
are considered to be purely idealistic in their motivation; later
on, rent-seeking behaviour will also be included in the model.
A policy can be represented by a point x ∈ B. Policy on
a certain issue j can subsequently be denoted as xj ∈Bj . A
party i ∈ P is assumed to give one of three qualiﬁcations
to a policy on a certain issue xj : desirable, acceptable and
unacceptable.
The points party i ﬁnds desirable on a certain issue j can
be represented by a set Wij ⊂ Bj , which will henceforth be
referred to as the desirability-set of party i on issue j . In
the same way all points which are deemed to be acceptable
to party i can be represented by an acceptability-set Aij ⊂Bj .
Points considered unacceptable are, consequently, all points
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in the complement of Aij , (A
i
j )
c. Points deemed desirable are
naturally deemed acceptable too: Wij ⊂ Aij . As the election
result is assumed to be given, a party i can be fully descri-
bed by a multiple (pi,Ai,W i), where Ai is deﬁned as Ai =Ai1×
Ai2 × · · · ×AiM , Wi as Wi =Wi1 ×Wi2 × · · · ×WiM , and pi as the





Parties can get into ofﬁce by forming a coalition which
supports a certain policy, represented by a point x ∈B. For-
ming a government is, therefore, equivalent to a mapping of





When starting negotiations, each party seeks to get a desirable
result on as many issues as possible without having to put up
with policies it deems unacceptable. A party i’s behaviour can
then be described thus:
max
x∈Ai
|{j ∈{1, . . . ,M}|xj ∈Wij }|, (2)
where x ∈Ai means that ∀Mj=1[xj ∈Aij ].
2.1. Solutions
In the following it is assumed that a coalition may form a
government if it represents a majority of the voters. In order
to accommodate this assumption, the set P ∗ is introduced as











In order to determine which government will be formed, the
value of such a government to each party must ﬁrst be deﬁ-
ned. While a government is determined by its policy x ∈ B
and a supporting coalition S⊂P ∗, its value to a party is only
dependent on the policy x.
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2.1.1. Value of policy
In line with the preceding, the value of a policy x to a party i
can be deﬁned as the number of issues on which a party suc-
ceeds in getting its desires fulﬁled, at least as long as no unac-
ceptable policy is implemented on any other issue: Ui(x) =
|{j =1, . . . ,M|xj ∈Wij }| if x ∈Ai . If the value of an unaccepta-
ble policy is set at −∞, Ui can be fully described as follows:
Ui(x)=
{
|{j =1, . . . ,M|xj ∈Wij }|, if x ∈Ai,
−∞, if x /∈Ai. (4)
Ui is, therefore, a function from the policy space to the set of
natural numbers united with −∞ (and 0):
Ui :B −→N∪{0}∪ {−∞}. (5)
The value of a policy x can then be described as U(x) =
(Ui(x))i∈P . From this N-dimensional vector, the revenue of
policy x can be read for each party. Since it concerns non-
transferable utility, this value cannot be described by a num-
ber but must remain a vector.
It has to be noted that a certain coalition does not neces-
sarily represent a unique value, as a coalition can usually sup-
port multiple policies.
The number of possible pay-off vectors U(x) is ﬁnite (al-
though the number of possible policies generating this pay-off
may be inﬁnite), as there is but a ﬁnite number of issues, each
generating a value of 0, 1, or −∞ for a party. The total num-
ber of pay-off vectors is, therefore, limited:
|{U(x)|x ∈B}|≤ (M +2)N . (6)
2.1.2. Possible governments
A majority coalition S ⊂P ∗ may be formed if a policy x ∈B
exists which is acceptable to all parties in that coalition, i.e.





A policy x ∈B is said to be feasible if ∃S ∈P ∗[x ∈AS ]. B∗ is
deﬁned as the set of all feasible policies.
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Parties endeavour to reach as high a level of utility as pos-
sible. Party behaviour is, therefore, aimed at ﬁnding support
for a policy which gives it the highest pay-off. This can be
represented mathematically by
max{Ui(x)|x ∈AS for some S ∈P ∗}. (7)
If no government is formed, each party’s utility is put at −∞.
From this, the set of stable policies C ⊂B can be deﬁned.
In order to do this a number of concepts must be deﬁned
ﬁrst. For x, y ∈B∗, y is said to defeat (or dominate) x, deno-
ted by yDx , if
yDx :=∃S ∈P ∗[y ∈AS & ∀i ∈S [Ui(y)≥Ui(x)]&∃k∈S
[Uk(y)>Uk(x)]]. (8)
A policy x ∈B∗ is subsequently said to be stable if there is no
alternative feasible policy y by which it is dominated:
xis stable :=¬∃y ∈B∗ [yDx ]. (9)
This makes it possible to deﬁne C as the set of all stable poli-
cies, i.e.
C ={x ∈B∗|x is stable}.3 (10)
3. GOVERNMENT FORMATION
The three questions posed at the beginning of the previous
section can now be answered as follows: it is possible to form
a government when a feasible policy exists, in other words, if
B∗ =∅.
The governments which can come into existence are basi-
cally all majority coalitions for which there exists a policy
acceptable to all its members:
{S ∈P ∗|AS = ∅}. Such a coalition can be said to be a feasible
coalition.
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A majority coalition S ∈P ∗ can only form a stable govern-
ment if AS ∩ C = ∅. Such a coalition can be called a stable
coalition.
A stable government can, therefore, be represented by a
pair (S, x) with S ∈P ∗ and x ∈AS ∩C. As it is likely that an
unstable government will fall, it is not unreasonable to assume
a stable government will be formed if one exists.
This gives rise to a number of interesting observations.
The model offers an explanation for the fact that sometimes
governments are formed which do not fulﬁl their term, as it
is possible that no stable coalition exists (i.e. C = ∅). From
the fact that the range of U is ﬁnite it follows that this can
only occur when cycles exist. The model, therefore, not only
states when no stable government exists; it also provides an
opportunity to determine which members of the opposition
are capable of bringing down an unstable government. By the
same reasoning it should be rather straightforward to deter-
mine the issue on which the governing coalition can be split.
The model also explains that sometimes no government can
be formed, which occurs when B∗ = ∅. As this would result
in a pay-off to all parties of −∞, this condition may also be
viewed necessary for no government being formed.
4. REMARKS
4.1. Different kinds of policy
It is possible to analyse many different kinds of issues at the
same time using this model. One issue may be represented
by a Euclidean space, while another is of a discrete nature.
Matters of allocation (like the ones Riker (1962) focuses on)
can also be incorporated into the model. To do this, simply
deﬁne the policy sub-space in question as the set of ordened
vectors assigning a piece of the pie to different recipients. If
these recipients are parties or party followers, this allows rent-
seeking behaviour to be incorporated into the model, as each
party can subsequently designate desirable and (un)acceptable
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allocations in this set with or without paying attention to the
shares allocated to parties other than themselves.
Preferences on cabinet formation can also be regarded as a
kind of rent-seeking as the distribution of seats in the cabinet
provide a party with prestige, beneﬁts and power. To include
this into the model, one simply adds a dimension to the
policy space. This dimension should be formed by the set of
(ordened) vectors assigning particular ministerial positions to
particular parties. Within this set, each party can express its
preferences again by means of acceptability and desirability
sets: WiM+1 ⊂AiM+1 ⊂BM+1. Moreover, for a fully rent-seeking
party the following will hold: ∀Mj=1[Aij =Bj & Wij =∅].
In much the same way, parties can express their preferences
on possible coalition partners. For this, an extra dimension
BM+2 is to be added ‘composition of government coalition’
consisting of all possible coalitions. In this, desired (typically,
these will tend to be coalitions of which the party is itself
a member), but especially unwanted (unacceptable), partners
can be denoted by deeming all those coalitions of which an
unwanted party is a member unacceptable. That these kinds
of considerations may be of importance is also noted by Edel-
man (1997).
This is especially interesting if one party is denounced by
other parties for some reason or other, such as parties whose
ideologies are frowned upon by other parties, or parties with
whom a party had bad experiences in the past. Such a party
could be eligible for government based on their preferences
but be prevented from participating by the unwillingness from
other parties (this is similar to the concept of quarrelling as
mentioned in Brams (1975) and Kilgour (1974)).
4.2. Government negotiations
Using the acceptability and desirability sets as deﬁned in this
article to represent party preferences makes it possible to set
absolute boundaries. Certain issues will not be backed by cer-
tain parties no matter how many other issues are offered to
them in compensation. This is a pleasant feature of the model
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as it enables one to distinguish pragmatic parties from par-
ties which take a more strict position. If, for example, Wi ≈Ai
holds for a certain party, this party can be seen as strict or
rigid. The model thus provides an opportunity to examine the
interactions between these kinds of parties.
As these boundaries are determined for each issue sepa-
rately, the possibility also arises to distinguish major issues
from minor ones. These can even differ for different parties;
an issue can be viewed as being of major importance by
one party, while being seen as inconsequential by another.
A make-or-break issue can, for instance, be represented by
Wij =Aij , whereas an issue which is deemed of no importance
whatsoever can be represented by Wij = ∅ and Aij = Bj . Ano-
ther way of differentiating between minor and major issues
would be to assign different weights to desirable results on
different issues in the parties’ utility functions Ui .
The model provides an opportunity to gain insight into the
roles different issues play during government negotiations. In
order to do this, a number of possibilities have to be discerned
on the joining of two parties (i and k) in one coalition. For
this, the concept of scoring on issues is introduced. A party i
is said to score on issue j if xj ∈Wij in the policy x adopted
by the government. This leads to the following observations:
1. Parties i and k cannot take part in the same coalition if
∃j [Aij ∩Akj =∅].
2. Only party i can score on issue j in a coalition with party
k if
Wij ∩Akj =∅ and Aij ∩Wkj =∅.
3. Neither party i, nor party k can score on issue j (in a
coalition with the other), but j is not an insurmountable
obstacle if
Wij ∩Akj =∅ and Wkj ∩Aij =∅ and Aij ∩Akj =∅.
4. Parties i and k can score simultaneously on issue j in a
coalition with the other if Wij ∩Wkj =∅.
5. Issue j is a point of negotiations between parties i and k,
i.e. both parties can score but not simultaneously, if
Wij ∩Akj =∅ and Wkj ∩Aij =∅ and Wij ∩Wkj =∅.
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It is clear from the above that the model allows parties to
support a bill which they do not really consider desirable (see
2, 3 and 5) and, hence, explains the occurrence of log-rolling.
Consider the case where there are two issues, j and l, of type
5, where party i agrees to let party k score on issue j, provi-
ded party k will do the same for party i on issue l. Similar
behaviour can occur on issues of types 2 and 3. A party will
only agree to support policy on such an issue which it does
not ﬁnd desirable, however, if the resulting coalition genera-
tes it enough value. The suggestion that log-rolling makes any
statements on the outcome impossible, which is sometimes
made, therefore, does not hold in this model, as log-rolling
can only occur with respect to issue j if Aij ∩Akj =∅.
As this model pays no attention to the voters’
preferences, the interesting question of whether log-rolling is
welfare enhancing (see, for example, Wittman (1995)) or redu-
cing, cannot be answered here. It is, however, possible to
indicate when and on which issues log-rolling may occur, pro-
viding a framework in which this question may be addressed.
4.3. Drawbacks of the model
A drawback of this way of modelling is the fact that no dif-
ferences in preference exist within the sets Wi , Ai , and (Ai)c.
To a degree, this can be circumvented by splitting Wi into
multiple sets such as ‘slightly desirable’, ‘desirable’ and ‘very
desirable’ and adjusting the utility functions of the parties
accordingly, generating higher levels of utility if the policy is
in a set of higher desirability. This adjustment of the model
has not been pursued in this article in order not to cloud the
underlying ideas and reasons for adopting this way of model-
ling by the additional complexity, but see Rusinowska et al.
(2005) for an example of how this adjustment can be imple-
mented in order to derive more precise results.
Some hesitation may arise on the use of inﬁnite nega-
tive utility for unacceptable policies. However, I feel this best
expresses the meaning of the term unacceptable, and the pos-
sibility it provides to incorporate absolute boundaries in the
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model is very useful to explain (limitations on) log-rolling.
For certain issues, no compensation can be given (legalising
euthanasia might, for instance, be such an issue for certain
religious parties). Any policies a party might be willing to
support even though they generate it negative utility in order
to achieve greater gains elsewhere must, when it comes down
to it, be acceptable to that party. The aforementioned way
of further specifying the desirability set can be used also to
specify acceptable policies which generate negative utility to a
party.
The independence of the separate issues can be debated as
it is rather likely that a policy is an integrated whole, rather
than just the sum of its parts. What is deemed desirable from
a ﬁnancial point of view is, for example, likely to have an
effect on what is considered desirable on the issue of ‘expenses
on social security’. A number of these problems can be sol-
ved by redeﬁning the policy space (the policy subspaces can,
in principle, be multi-dimensional themselves). This, however,
will not always be possible.
5. EXAMPLE
In this example four parties are negotiating the formation of
government. The ﬁfth party (O) can be regarded as a collec-
tion of other (small) parties who, in order to keep the exam-
ple clear, are supposed not to be eligible for government: P =
{Q,V,R,D,O}. The shares of the votes received by the parties
are presented in Table I.
The policy space spans ﬁve dimensions (M = 5), three
of which are sub-sets of R (e.g. ‘health care expenditure’,
‘amount of cut-backs’ and ‘level of social security payments’
(units may vary over dimensions) and two yes/no decisions
(e.g. ‘implementing universal conscription’ and ‘opening civil
marriage to couples of the same sex’), B = R3+ × {yes, no} ×
{yes, no}. The acceptability and desirability sets are presen-
ted in Table II. The majority coalitions are given by: P ∗ =
{QVRD,QVR,VRD,QRD,QVD,QV }.
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TABLE I
Parliamentary balance of power
Party Percentage of votes Party Percentage of votes
Q 29 D 8




Party Acceptability set (Ai) Desirability set (Wi)
Q [7,20]× [1,8]× [5,9] [10,14]× [2,4]× [7,8]
×{yes, no}×{yes, no} ×{yes}×{yes}
V [2,7]× [5,20]× [3,6] [4,7]× [5,10]× [4,5]
×{yes, no}×{yes, no} ×{no}×{yes}
R [4,20]× [2,10]× [5,8] [6,9]× [3,6]× [6,7]
×{yes, no}×{no} ×{no}×{no}
D [1,14]× [1,18]× [4,8] [8,10]× [2,5]× [5,6]
×{yes}×{yes} ×{yes}×{yes}
Dimension ﬁve eliminates every coalition containing ‘RD’
as AR5 ∩ AD5 = ∅. This reduces the number of feasible majo-
rity coalitions to three: QV , QVR and QVD. These coaliti-
ons’ options are depicted in Table III.
TABLE III
Feasible coalitions
Coalition Feasible policies (AS)
QV {7}× [5,8]× [5,6]×{yes, no}×{yes, no}
QVR {7}× [5,8]× [5,6]×{yes, no}×{no}
QVD {7}× [5,8]× [5,6]×{yes,}×{yes}
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It is important to note that both party R and party V
will always score on issue 1, whereas Q and D never will. V
will, furthermore, always score on the second issue as AQV2 =
A
QVR
2 =AQVD2 ⊂WV2 . Also noteworthy is the fact that Q and
V can never be faced with unacceptable results. This follows
from the fact that they are part of every feasible coalition.
Where the stakes of the game are a matter of maximising
their gain for Q and V , the game is much more conclusive for
R and D as they could be facing unacceptable results at the
end of it. An overview of all attainable pay-off vectors is pre-
sented in Table IV.
It is striking that the party who emerged strongest from
the elections (Q) scores consistently less than the other party/
parties with whom they form a coalition. In itself this is not
particularly relevant as each party only strives to the highest
pay-off to itself without paying any attention to the conse-
quences to other parties. On the other hand this also means
that a considerable part of the electorate indirectly supports
a policy which it may not necessarily want. In any case, it
does not hold that government policy coincides largely with
the wishes of the largest party, as is, for instance, assumed in
Downs (1957) and in one of the models suggested by Kirch-
steiger and Puppe (1997). It is furthermore true that no sta-
ble governments containing R exist; whereas a stable coalition
containing D exists, even though Q and V are also able to
form a stable government on their own.
In this example, the set of stable policies is given by
C ={(7; [5,8];5;no;yes), (7;5;5;yes;yes)}.
All stable governments are presented in Table V.
This example shows that it is possible for a party which is
not needed for the formation of a majority coalition to still
partake in government (D).
5.1. Expansion: rent-seeking
This example will now be expanded by assuming that parties
have, next to the aforementioned preferences, ideas about the
composition of cabinet.
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TABLE V
Stable governments
(QV, (7; [5,8];5;no;yes)) (QV, (7;5;5;yes;yes))
(QVD, (7;5;5;yes;yes))
Let the cabinet consist of 14 ministerial positions. Parties
are assumed to provide candidates for ministerial positions
only in governments they support. The parties have the follo-
wing preferences:
Q: Demands
– No other party may occupy half or more than half of the
seats in government.
– At least as many ministerial positions as any other party.
Desires
– More ministerial positions than any other party.
V: Demands
– Ministerial positions are to be divided amongst coalition
partners according to their relative power in parliament (or
more are to be given to V).
Desires
– six or more ministerial positions (in addition to the above).
D: Demands
– At least two ministerial positions.
Desires
– Three or more ministerial positions.
R: Demands = Desires
– Divide ministerial positions amongst coalition members accor-
ding to their relative power in parliament.
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It is, of course, possible to write down all possible dis-
tributions of ministerial positions over parties and subse-
quently designate desirability and acceptability sets for all
parties using ordened vectors. This somewhat tedious labour
is not necessary, however, and is, therefore, omitted.
From this, AQV6 = ∅ follows, as V demands seven mini-
sterial positions in the coalition QV , which is half of the
total number of seats in the cabinet, which is unacceptable
to Q. Remarkably though, AQVD6 ={(6,6,2)} = ∅, and AQVR6 =
{(5,5,4)} =∅.
If the composition of the cabinet is incorporated in this
way, only one stable coalition results: QVD. This shows that
it is possible that two parties which together occupy more
than half of the seats in parliament are not able to form a
government on their own, while they can if a third party is
included.
Using this way of modelling party preferences over coali-
tions is preferable over the more standard approach of assu-
ming that each party will attempt to simply maximise the
number of seats in government (see, for instance, the way
Kirchsteiger and Puppe (1997) implement ofﬁce seeking con-
siderations). Not only might a party have a special interest
in particular ministerial positions (Green parties might for
instance be particularly interested in securing the position
of ‘minister of environmental issues’), it also — and more
importantly — allows parties to take the distribution of power
into account in a more reﬁned way. As the literature on
powerindices shows (see, for instance Laurelle and Valenciano
(2005)), it is not only a party’s (own) size that determines its
power.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The model presented in this paper is shown to be widely app-
licable: accommodating many different kinds of issues, either
discrete or continuous in nature; allowing for both rentseeking
and idealistic party motivations; for strict and pragmatic par-
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ties; discerning major from minor issues; as well as allowing
for more reﬁned (and realistic) concerns about the distribu-
tion of power. It accounts for the occurrence of issues which
often are problematic for standard theories and approaches,
the most important being log-rolling and non-minimally win-
ning governments.
The model can be reﬁned in several ways in order to appro-
ximate real life situations more closely. One such reﬁnement
has been explored in Rusinowska et al. (2005) and software
exists that can be used to derive speciﬁc information on party
preferences for such extentions, see for instance Roubens et al.
The concept of stability for these kinds of models is explored
extensively in Rusinowska et al. (2005), providing a bases for
further analysis, both theoretical and applied, of the govern-
ment negotiations should multiple stable coalitions exist. (see
for instance articles by Berghammer et al., Eklund et al. and
Rusinowska and De Swart).
When the outcome of such processes is sufﬁciently rese-
arched the model could, theoretically at least, also be used
to provide voters with information on the ultimate results of
the outcomes of parliamentary elections, enabling them to use
this information when casting their votes. This in turn could
be used to analyse party positioning prior to elections. The
possibilities this model provides for incorporating distincti-
ons between minor and major issues (which may be different
for different parties) as well as the difference between strict
and more ﬂexible parties may proof to be very useful in this
respect, as this may be particularly relevant to voters.
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NOTES
1. Minimal winning coalitions were introduced by Riker (1962). The
main underlying idea is that parties having to divide a ﬁxed sum
of money will tend to minimise the number of recipients in order
to lay claim to as large an amount as possible. Non-minimum win-
ning coalitions have been known to occur, for example after the
1998 Dutch parliamentary elections, the parties PvdA and VVD had
enough seats to form a government, yet the coalition PvdA, VVD
and D66 was formed. For empirical research into the occurrence of
certain types of government coalitions see De Swaan (1973) and Tay-
lor and Laver (1973).
2. It is well known that parties sometimes support bills they do not
prefer in order to gain support for another bill which they deem of
great importance. (see for instance Dunleavy (1991)). This kind of
vote-trading behaviour is known as log-rolling and is sometimes said
to make any predictions on government policy impossible.
3. In Rusinowska et al. (2005) a comprehensive analysis of different
deﬁnitions for stability for an extended version of this model is pro-
vided, including the derivation of necessary and sufﬁcient conditions.
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